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kindred or friends or that any special obligation is imposed by gratitude. Yet it does not mean that "everybody is to count for one." On the contrary, each is to count according to his moral worth, that is (we infer), according to the objectivity of his point of view. The impersonal principle reaches the climax in its interpretation of the virtue of chastity. Supposing, we are told, that all utilitarian inconveniences were set aside, a society composed exclusively of Don Juans and courtesans would still be immoral—because such a society would be lacking in personal loyalties? No; because it would involve a disrespect for the sexual relation.

Such an anti-climax, it seems to me, is the doom of any ethical theory that undertakes, after the fashion of natural science, to treat human conduct impersonally. For my own part, I believe that a similar paradox is hidden in the conception of an impersonal science. But in ethics the paradox is more patent. One need only ask how the sexual relation could even be formulated by one who had strictly abstracted from his own impulse of sex. Yet not more in ethics than in natural science is the demand for 'objectivity' meaningless. What is meant, I should say, is, not that our point of view should be impersonal, but that it should be comprehensively personal; not that no person should count for more than another, but rather that no *person* should be sacrificed for another, that every genuine and well-considered personal ideal should be treated as absolutely important. Such an objectivity will require, not an abstraction from the demands of self, but quite the reverse. When I am tempted to suppose that life cannot be so significant for my neighbor as it is for me—and therefore to put myself first—or, say, that his children cannot possibly be so interesting as mine, then I am bidden to ask whether from the more or less hidden recesses of his own personal outlook his life may not present as full a significance as mine offers me and whether as parent he is not in a better position to estimate the personal qualities of his seemingly uninteresting offspring. Here the essence of objectivity is not impersonality, but sympathy. But the sympathetic appreciation of another self will be merely a faint sentimentality if the self in me is not imperative and intense.

How these personal ends are to be adjusted without sacrifice is a supremely difficult problem. Yet the problem is not theoretically insoluble. And it seems to me that, if we admit that moral problems are personal, this is the problem that we have to face, while if we deny that they are personal we are left with no values whatsoever. An impersonally objective ethics faces the absurdity (*e. g.*) of cultivating for its own abstract sake a chastity which concerns nobody under the sun.

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A New Conception of Relativity and Locke. (University of Cincinnati Studies.)

By HENRY G. HARTMANN. Published by the University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, 1914.—pp. 96.

The title of this monograph is hardly fortunate and the author's brief introduction is not calculated to dispel one's first impression that novelty,

rather than thoroughness of treatment, is what is aimed at. The assumption that the principle of relativity "has never been subjected to a critical examination" (p. 5) is not reassuring, and the implied belief that the key to Locke's meaning is to be found in Book III of the *Essay* is perhaps even less so. The 'traditional' interpretation of Locke against which Dr. Hartmann contends apparently is that Locke is always primarily a sensationalist in his constructive work, and that the other tendencies of his thought are to be dismissed as mere 'inconsistencies.' It may well be doubted if the 'traditional' interpretation of Locke, assuming that there is one, is as one-sided as this; but one begins to understand the author's point of view when he says: "The whole matter hinges upon the rôle of the simple ideas. Are they at bottom to be taken as working assumptions or as actual facts?" (p. 7). This is a real problem, probably recognized as such by many careful students of Locke at the present time, and the degree of emphasis given to this question is bound to influence any attempt to define Locke's true position in the development of modern philosophy. The merit of the present monograph lies in the careful analysis of the various assumptions, explicit and implicit, of the philosopher, together with the methods, often plainly conflicting, employed by him in the course of the argument of the *Essay*.

Dr. Hartmann has not undertaken a historical study; his method throughout is that of logical analysis, and Locke's *Essay* has been treated much as if it were a contemporary work. There are certain advantages in such a method, as well as certain obvious disadvantages. On the one hand, the reader's attention is kept focused upon certain fundamental logical issues; on the other hand, there is a temptation to carry ingenious analysis too far, and, in particular, to employ an up-to-date terminology that is partly misleading as applied to a work published two and a quarter centuries ago. The fact that such a method of treatment does not lend itself to connected exposition does not particularly matter, as the author is writing only for technical students of philosophy, who may be assumed to be familiar with the text of the *Essay* and with the various interpretations of its significance that have been seriously considered.

It is difficult to indicate the gist of Dr. Hartmann's elaborate treatment, which is intended to be constructive as well as critical, but perhaps the following will indicate the general trend of his argument. Locke's simple ideas would at first appear to be non-relative, mere factual particulars, the relations of which must necessarily be wholly external and factitious. But if nothing exists except such particulars, all knowledge is irrelevant. In truth, fact can never be wholly divorced from meaning. Even particular 'things,' when at all exactly determined, are in part the 'workmanship of the mind,'—in other words, 'constructs' within some sphere of relevance. Moreover, "*no single situation of actual existence can reveal or exhaust an object's total actuality, that is, all its possible phases or qualities*" (p. 17). Locke's argument tends to show that "reality in the last analysis is determined in ideas, formed under the control of ends or purposes within a world of relatively

determined needs. . . . This is at once relativistic, positivistic, pragmatic, and constructive" (p. 18). As regards the 'simple' ideas, with which we seemed to start, these are gradually found to be complex, derived, and conditioned. Otherwise expressed, "they become increasingly regarded as working assumptions and less and less as established facts" (p. 22). As regards 'complex' ideas, not only are substances (so far as knowable) and relations (taken in any definite sense) 'constructs,' but the same really applies to 'modes' as well (p. 74). And yet none of these are more arbitrary than the purposes which determine their spheres of relevance, and these may be as significant as you please for the interpretation of experience.

The author's own position, which is more or less involved throughout, seems to be a sort of compromise between idealism and pragmatism. It might perhaps be described as instrumental idealism, recognizing the reality of change and actual novelty in the world process, with strong but not unambiguous emphasis upon individuality in terms of the self. It is equally opposed to sensationalism, any form of realism which insists upon the externality of relations, and absolute idealism. In the opinion of the reviewer, Dr. Hartmann not infrequently reads too much into Locke—not merely too much of more modern philosophy, but too much of his individual point of view—but he is right in attempting to differentiate Locke's constructive method, however imperfectly worked out, from the essentially destructive method of Hume.

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The Great Society. A Psychological Analysis. By GRAHAM WALLAS. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914.—pp. xii, 383.

Those who have profited by this author's well-known *Human Nature in Politics* will welcome this volume, which is also written "with the purpose of bringing the knowledge which has been accumulated by psychologists into touch with the practical problems of present civilized life." By the "Great Society" is meant the organization of society in our time, transformed as it has become, in the extent and in the interdependence of its members, as a consequence of the industrial revolution. After outlining his main psychological positions, Professor Wallas considers in separate chapters the significance for the Great Society of habit, fear, pleasure-pain, crowd psychology, love and hatred, and the thought processes. While the importance of each of these is found to have been exaggerated by a different school of social philosophers, all, except perhaps fear, are to some extent practically desirable as agencies of social control.

The "crowd psychologists"—Bagehot, Tarde, Le Bon, and Ross—as well as McDougall, come in for particular criticism. It is shown that 'imitation,' 'suggestion' and 'sympathy' are loose descriptive phrases and lack scientific precision. In opposition to McDougall it is contended that the various thought processes are equally innate with the instincts, and in no way depen-